{"id":349176,"date":"2024-10-20T00:35:15","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T00:35:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-en-419211-32013\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T00:14:36","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T00:14:36","slug":"bs-en-419211-32013","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-en-419211-32013\/","title":{"rendered":"BS EN 419211-3:2013"},"content":{"rendered":"
This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device with signing keys import possibility: SSCD with key import (SSCD KI).<\/p>\n
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Terms and definitions 4 PP introduction 4.1 PP reference 4.2 PP overview <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
8<\/td>\n | 4.3 TOE overview 4.3.1 Operation of the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
10<\/td>\n | 4.3.2 Target of evaluation 4.3.3 TOE lifecycle 4.3.3.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
12<\/td>\n | 4.3.3.2 Preparation stage 4.3.3.3 Operational use stage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
13<\/td>\n | 5 Conformance claims 5.1 CC conformance claim 5.2 PP claim, Package claim 5.3 Conformance rationale 5.4 Conformance statement <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
14<\/td>\n | 6 Security problem definition 6.1 Assets, users and threat agents 6.2 Threats <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
15<\/td>\n | 6.3 Organisational security policies <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
16<\/td>\n | 6.4 Assumptions 7 Security objectives 7.1 Security objectives for the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
18<\/td>\n | 7.2 Security objectives for the operational environment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
20<\/td>\n | 7.3 Security objectives rationale 7.3.1 Security objectives backtracking <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
21<\/td>\n | 7.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency 7.3.2.1 Countering of threats by security objectives: <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
22<\/td>\n | 7.3.2.2 Enforcement of OSPs by security objectives: <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
24<\/td>\n | 7.3.2.3 Upkeep of assumptions by security objectives: 8 Extended components definition FPT_EMS TOE Emanation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
25<\/td>\n | 9 Security requirements 9.1 Security functional requirements 9.1.1 Use of requirement specifications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
26<\/td>\n | 9.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
27<\/td>\n | 9.1.3 User data protection (FDP) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
32<\/td>\n | 9.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
33<\/td>\n | 9.1.5 Security management (FMT) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
37<\/td>\n | 9.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
40<\/td>\n | 9.2 Security assurance requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
41<\/td>\n | 9.3 Security requirements rationale 9.3.1 Security requirement coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
42<\/td>\n | 9.3.2 Security functional requirements sufficiency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
44<\/td>\n | 9.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
45<\/td>\n | 9.3.4 Rationale for chosen security assurance requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Device with key import<\/b><\/p>\n |